Food-delivery behavior under crowd sourcing mobility services

The rapid development of the online food-delivery industry, has led to not only increases in the number of the crowd-sourced shared food-delivery service drivers on our roads, but also growing urban traffic safety management concerns. This study investigates the decision-making behaviors that exist between delivery drivers, their food-delivery platform and their potential impact on traffic safety. Using the evolutionary game theory, stakeholder decision-making behaviors involving traffic safety within the food-delivery industry were analyzed. From our analysis, several behavioral influencers were identified, including penalties for traffic violations, the opportunity cost of delivery drivers complying with traffic rules, the costs associated with risk and strict management approaches, reputation incentives, costs related to the delivery platform being punished, the probability of compliance with traffic rules, and the probability of adopting a strict management approach by the delivery platform. Our study demonstrates that stabilization strategies used by the food service industry differ when the types of government control measures also differ. When the government takes a more aggressive approach to regulation and control, compliance with the traffic rules and the adoption of strict enforcement measures by management are the only evolutionary stability strategies available to food-delivery platforms. As part of a strict management strategy, appropriate compensation or incentive measures should be provided by the distribution platform. Furthermore, the fines given for traffic violations should be increased to create a safer road environment that has fewer traffic accidents involving food-delivery drivers.